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Structured reflection has been shown to improve the diagnostic competence of 
undergraduate and postgraduate trainees in a range of experimental settings using 
written case scenarios. Evidence supporting the use of this strategy during real 
patient encounters is lacking. This paper reports on a study conducted to determine 
the effects of structured reflection on the diagnostic accuracy of postgraduate 
medical trainees during bedside tutorials using real patient encounters.   
Method 
Fifty-five postgraduate trainees in Internal Medicine at the University of Cape Town, 
South Africa, were prospectively studied during 18 beside tutorials using real patient 
encounters. Each patient encounter was conducted as a 4-stage diagnostic process 
and a diagnostic accuracy score (DAS) was calculated for all participants at each 
stage:  
• DAS 1: immediately upon arrival at the patient’s bedside (visual cues only);  
• DAS 2: after an oral presentation of the interview and physical examination 
findings (pre-reflection);  
• DAS 3: after review of the clinical data using a process of structured reflection 
(post-reflection);  
• DAS 4: after discussion of the patient facilitated by the attending physician 
(facilitated reflection).  
Memory structure and flexibility in thinking of participants were evaluated using the 
Diagnostic Thinking Inventory (DTI) and compared to their post-reflection diagnostic 
accuracy scores. 
Results     
A total of 212 diagnostic events were studied. Friedman’s test demonstrated a 
significant difference when comparing the median diagnostic accuracy scores (DAS) 
of the respective stages of the diagnostic process (χ2 (3) = 406.34, p value < 0.001). 
iv 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirmed that there was a significant difference 
between the immediate DAS (DAS 1) and the pre-reflection DAS (DAS 2) (Z = 8.66, 
p value < 0.001), the pre-reflection DAS (DAS 2) and the post reflection DAS 
(DAS 3) (Z = 4.98, p value < 0.001). Linear regression identified a significant 
relationship between DTI scores and DAS 3 (p value = 0.035), however this explains 
only a small portion of the variation in the data (r2 = 0.093). 
Conclusion 
Structured reflection improved the diagnostic accuracy of postgraduate trainees 
during real patient encounters at the bedside. These data provide support for the 
suggestion that clinical teachers should consider adding structured reflection to their 
toolbox of bedside teaching strategies. In addition, DTI scores may help clinical 
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Clinical reasoning is a multifaceted, cognitive process health care practitioners use 
to evaluate a patient’s medical problem(s), formulate a working clinical diagnosis and 
develop an appropriate management plan.1 The diagnostic thinking process, a term 
coined by Grant, née Gale, in the early 1980s,2 requires careful consideration of 
each piece of information obtained during the patient consultation, to determine the 
most plausible explanation(s) for the presenting problem(s).3 This process is central 
to the provision of efficient, safe patient care.4,5   
More than four decades of research has been dedicated to unravelling the diagnostic 
reasoning process.3,6 This complex skill, the sum of thinking and decision-making, 
gains an inherent mystique owing to the fact that each patient consultation is a 
unique combination of multiple, case-specific variables. A sound foundation of 
biomedical knowledge, derived from both theory and practical experience, together 
with the learned skill of systematically processing clinical data, enable expert 
clinicians to select out the ‘high predictive value’ information required to make a 
correct diagnosis.7 The reflective ability of expert clinicians has recently been 
identified as an additional metaskill required to enhance the clinician’s diagnostic 
reasoning potential.8 Expert diagnosticians, who make these complex decisions 
effortlessly, ‘showcase’ the gold standard of clinical reasoning.5 
1.2 REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIAGNOSTIC THINKING PROCESS 
Sternberg and Horvath succinctly framed the essential building blocks of the 
diagnostic reasoning process as three features that characterize the practice of 
experts in real world settings. These three attributes enable experts to redefine a 
problem in accordance with their experience and move forward to solve it more 
efficiently.9 (Figure 1.1) 
2 
Figure 1.1: Essential building blocks of the diagnostic reasoning process 
Knowing more about the basic building blocks of the diagnostic process is critical for 
clinician educators tasked with the responsibility of educating health care 
professionals.5 Furthermore, while the process of becoming an expert follows a 
continuum of experiential learning, an understanding of the subconsciously attained 
attributes attached to knowledge structures and problem-solving skills can also be 
used to mediate improvements in the diagnostic competence of clinical trainees.10  
So, given the key contributions that biomedical knowledge, memory structures and 
reflection on experience make to the conversation about clinical reasoning, each are 
briefly discussed in this section of the literature review.  
1.3 BIOMEDICAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE 
Biomedical knowledge, the scientific foundation of clinical reasoning, is made up of 
basic sciences, clinical knowledge and experiential learning.11 While the specific role 
of basic sciences knowledge in the diagnostic reasoning process has only been 
determined here recently,10-14 the importance of the integration of these subsets of 
information, to develop a coherent knowledge structure that supports all the cognitive 
aspects of medical practice, has been appreciated for more than four decades.15  
Two major advances, with regard to the role of biomedical knowledge in the process 
















education forward. First, the work by Feltovich and Barrows introduced the concept 
of cognitive frameworks that allow experts to deal expediently with the usual 
variations of a particular illness.16,17 This led to the introduction of the term ‘illness 
script’ by Boshuizen and Schmidt in 1992.10 This term describes the mental 
representation acquired by experienced clinicians that organizes the biomedical 
knowledge they use to make diagnoses into customized ‘bytes’, which enables them 
to rapidly make diagnoses of illnesses previously encountered. So, illness scripts, 
which arise from repeated experiences within real world events, are about what is 
expected, what acceptable variations of an illness are and how these variations 
relate to one another.17  
Second, our understanding of the ‘packing’ of essential biomedical knowledge has 
been further enhanced by the recognition that experts, early on during a clinical 
encounter, identify key features of the clinical presentation that facilitate the rapid 
and efficient retrieval of these ‘bytes’ of essential knowledge needed to make a 
diagnosis and institute an effective management plan.18,19 
Based on the preceding discussion it is clear that a key fundamental difference 
between experts and novices, with regard to biomedical knowledge, is that novices 
store and use biomedical knowledge in a haphazard way that initially does not 
facilitate the diagnostic process.20 Experts, on the other hand, have customized, 
well-organized, easily retrievable encapsulated knowledge, which translates into the 
ability to rapidly and efficiently solve routine clinical problems.5 This, combined with 
experience and the ability to critically reflect upon one’s professional practice 
(discussed later), underpins the accuracy characteristic of the diagnoses made by 
expert diagnosticians.21    
1.4 COGNITION AND EXPERTISE 
The knowledge structures and cognitive processes that underpin human 
performance are critically important to the process of making a diagnosis.22 Both 
performance and learning are functions of domain-specific knowledge and 
successful medical decision-making relies on both the efficient use of this 
information as well as productive problem-solving strategies.22,23 
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The critical role of knowledge structures in diagnostic thinking was first appreciated 
in the early 1970s when Ausubel and colleagues wrote that ‘it [structuring] plays a 
key note in problem solving and involves a reorganization of the residue of past 
experiences so as to fit the particular requirement of the current situation’.24 This was 
followed by the work of Janet Grant, née Gale, in which she focused on the key role 
memory structures play in the diagnostic reasoning process by exploring the 
‘structuring’ and ‘extrapolation’ of information already organized in memory.2 This 
work lead to the development of a Diagnostic Thinking Inventory (DTI), a self-
administered instrument designed to provide insight into the changes in memory 
structure and flexibility of thinking.25 The DTI is discussed in more detail later in this 
review 
While human cognition is constrained by the limits of working memory (the system 
responsible for processing new and previously stored information),22 the 
comprehensive, well organized and densely interconnected knowledge base of 
expert clinicians allows them to circumvent some of these limitations.26 Indeed, the 
more frequently knowledge is used, referred to as ‘deliberate practise’, the smoother, 
more efficient and automated the observed performance of experts becomes.27 
Intermediate learners have lots of knowledge in place but lack the extensive 
connectedness displayed by experts, and novices have a sparse knowledge base 
with few connections.22 These limitations curb the ability of junior trainees to 
efficiently and effectively conduct cognitive searches required to make a clinical 
diagnosis.  
1.5 CRITICAL REFLECTION  
When approaching clinical problems the hallmark of experts is that they largely make 
diagnoses using pattern recognition and illness script comparison strategies.27,28 
However, when the problem is not familiar, they spend more time and effort on 
reframing the clinical problem until the unusual or atypical presentation is 
recognized, using supportive problem-solving methods to arrive at a diagnosis.29 In 
this setting, the patient interview is more thorough and directed, the physical 
examination is more comprehensive and investigations are used more liberally to 
support or refute the hypothesis(es) at hand.30 There is a psychological shift, such 
that an openness to recognize and accept difficulties becomes the nature of the task, 
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and ultimately, an environment in which the problem can be better understood, is 
fostered.7,31 This defines the reflective practitioner whereby, under these 
circumstances, reflective skills allow the practitioner to set up and follow a systematic 
plan to address potential alternative diagnoses.32 This strategy results in a broader 
base of hypotheses from which solutions can be drawn and renders the practitioner 
more mindful and attentive to discrepancies in supporting data.  
Having highlighted the essential roles of biomedical knowledge, cognition and 
reflection in the diagnostic process, the ways in which these building blocks are used 
to make a clinical diagnosis are described in the next section of this literature review.   
1.6 COGNITIVE PROCESSES USED TO MAKE A DIAGNOSIS  
1.6.1 Hypothetico-deductive model 
The earliest formulation of diagnostic reasoning and problem solving described the 
process as one of hypothesis generation and testing.33 The clinician generated a 
limited number of hypotheses using the information at hand and each hypothesis, 
together with its likelihood of occurrence, was used to guide the collection of further 
clinical information to support or refute the hypotheses under consideration. In this 
model, clinicians actively sought clues with positive or negative predictive value, and, 
as each hypothesis was addressed and supporting evidence provided, the quality 
and specificity of the hypothesis improved. It became evident that experienced 
physicians generated better hypotheses more rapidly than novice clinicians who 
often had difficulty moving beyond the collection of necessary data and struggled to 
synthesize a diagnosis.34 
1.6.2 Dual Processing 
In the early 1990s, the dual process theory, stemming largely from the work done by 
Epstein and Hammond, emerged as a more comprehensive model of diagnostic 
thinking.35,36 This theory describes two cognitive systems that are jointly involved in 
the process of making a diagnosis. 
Type 1 reasoning is an ‘intuitive system’ of hypothesis generation commonly 
described as a ‘gut feeling’. It is a reflex and rapid cognitive response to a familiar 
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clinical problem.37 Readily available contextual information cues the immediate 
recognition of typical illness configurations known as illness scripts, which generates 
automated hypotheses.35 
Work done by Gale, which looked at the initiation of the diagnostic reasoning 
process, showed that the process of problem solving starts as soon as the first piece 
of clinical information is elicited. Immediate cues, even from a single piece of 
information, can be interpreted from extrapolated memorized content.2,38 
Verbal cues and visual information, regarding a patient’s suspected problem, are 
non-redundant. When reviewed, each has a significant, absolute impact on the 
assessment of disease probability, and the identification of visual (non-verbal) 
information is a highly influential subset skill in the reasoning process.39 Previous 
work has documented that if an expert takes into consideration the correct diagnosis 
during the first five minutes of a consultation, this hypothesis becomes definite in 
ninety-five percent of the cases.40 
The second cognitive process, Type 2 reasoning, is an ‘analytical’ system involving 
the deliberate sorting of information used to generate likely hypotheses.35 While this 
process, which relies on rational judgment, shares similarities with the earlier 
hypothetic-deductive model of hypothesis generation and testing, it places an 
increased emphasis on the reflective skills of the clinician.34  
Constructing multiple hypotheses about a clinical problem, and reflecting on the 
validity and implications of each of these, as described by Dewey in 1933, creates an 
enriched understanding of the problem, which leads to an efficient and thoughtful 
approach to solving it.41 Encapsulated knowledge, which evolves from this 
behaviour, enhances the quality of the illness scripts, highlighting a relationship that 
in future allows for exemplars of the problem to be approached using a more intuitive 
diagnostic reasoning process.32,42  
1.7 ‘TYPE 1’ VERSUS ‘TYPE 2’ REASONING  
Type 1 and Type 2 processing strategies are jointly involved throughout the process 
of making a diagnosis.43 The order in which clinicians proceed when solving 
diagnostic problems is, however, variable. While the specific context in which one 
7 
system predominates over the other remains unclear,44 it is accepted that 
experienced physicians use ‘intuition’ to solve simple, uncomplicated, day-to-day 
problems.45 Type 2 reasoning, an analytical approach, is favoured when the outcome 
stakes are high, the situation is complex and ill-defined, or if there is an air of 
uncertainty in the way the problem is structured.43,46 The reasoning process is not 
always as clear-cut as this and real problems, which are always multifactorial, are 
solved with an approach that includes both Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes.47 
1.8 UNDERSTANDING CLINICAL REASONING ERRORS 
Based on our current understanding of clinical reasoning, it should be possible to 
determine and remediate biases in the cognitive processes that result in diagnostic 
errors. Addressing system-related diagnostic errors could bring about significant 
improvements in diagnostic accuracy and patient care.48 
Diagnostic errors occur in about fifteen percent of patient encounters.49 Whilst it 
seems reasonable to postulate that most errors in clinical decision making are 
largely due to gaps in the medical knowledge of practicing clinicians, the majority of 
errors that do occur, at least in part, result from individual doctor cognitive 
processing biases rather that knowledge gaps.  
The educational literature has identified cognitive errors as one of the greatest 
challenges that need to be addressed to reduce the morbidity and mortality 
associated with clinical error.48 Furthermore, it is essential that these errors are 
understood and addressed in the context of the clinical reasoning process to ensure 
that educational strategies continue to focus on ways of improving the diagnostic 
accuracy of both students and doctors alike.  
The literature remains divided on which system of thinking encourages more bias. 
The cognitive forcing strategies associated with Type 2 processing may be thought 
of as being preventative by limiting the use of pattern recognition pathways that can 
lead to error. However, it has been shown that conscious, deliberated, slow 
reasoning in novices’ results in poorer performance.21 While these studies provide 
useful information, it should be remembered that research of this nature focuses on 
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the rudimentary analytical processing ability of novices and not the cognitive 
processing skills of experienced experts.  
It is worth noting that slowing down and increasing attention to analytical thinking are 
insufficient to increase diagnostic accuracy,44 even though this is a fundamental rule 
of human performance. So, regardless of the type of reasoning employed, none will 
improve accuracy if the fundamental requirements of diagnostic thinking, including 
high-quality foundation knowledge, are not met.50     
It therefore makes sense that Norman and Eva, doyens in the world of medical 
education, concluded in their review entitled ‘Diagnostic error and clinical reasoning’, 
that diagnostic error cannot be ascribed to a particular type of cognitive processing 
since each problem addressed by the clinician requires a different interaction of both 
types of cognitive processes. They proposed, “Errors are likely to result from an 
interaction between knowledge deficits and processing problems, not from one or the 
other.”6 
1.9 STRATEGIES THAT SUPPORT DIAGNOSTIC THINKING PROCESSES 
Rapid advances in biomedical knowledge are producing an ever-increasing volume 
of ‘must know’ information. This, together with a shift from didactic, lecture-based 
teaching, thought to encourage passive, rote learning, is driving the increasing 
interest in learning strategies that may help students organize, store, integrate and 
recall information more effectively and efficiently.51, 52 
There is ongoing interest in learning methods based on the hypothesis that 
meaningful learning occurs when new information is assimilated within existing 
frameworks.24 So, strategies aimed at improving the quality of mental frameworks of 
trainees have been introduced.53 
1.9.1 Structured reflection to enhance diagnostic accuracy 
Pioneers in the field of reflective practice in medicine, Mamede and Schmidt have 
explored the behaviours and reasoning processes of primary health care doctors 
when dealing with complex and unusual clinical problems.29,42,54 Initial research 
provided empirical evidence for the development of a theoretical model describing 
9 
 
the multidimensional nature of reflective thinking. This model describes five sets of 
behaviours, attitudes and reasoning processes, which are used when addressing 
complex clinical tasks.32 (Figure 1.2) 
 
Figure 1.2: Multidimensional nature of reflective thinking 
This empiric structure gave Mamede a framework to explore the impact of a process 
of structured reflection on the diagnostic accuracy of novice learners.28,32,42 
Participants were asked to provide a list of hypotheses for a ‘paper-case’ problem, 
and then record the findings, which did, or did not, support their diagnostic options. 
Structured reflection, using these ‘paper-cases’ appeared to enhance the learning of 
clinical knowledge and was therefore deemed to be an effective instructional 
approach to developing diagnostic competence in students.42 Further work showed 
that reflection, performed by postgraduate medical residents, also generated more 
accurate hypotheses, and that this effect was more pronounced in complex medical 
cases.28  
In this work it was also found that non-analytical reasoning methods, such as pattern 
recognition, were as effective as reflective reasoning for diagnosing routine clinical 
cases. It wasn’t until participants were exposed to clinical situations of uncertainty 
and uniqueness that the value of reflection as a tool to improve diagnostic accuracy 
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helped to foster the acquisition and maintenance of diagnostic expertise.27,28 
Mamede and colleagues have suggested that reflection not only enriches the mental 
representation of diseases, but also influences representation-related, but different 
diseases.54  
1.9.2 Role of the teacher 
Because of the paucity of scientific evidence regarding optimal learning strategies, 
many teaching approaches are based largely on expert opinion.55 Strategies are 
aimed at encouraging teachers to facilitate learning instead of trying to impart 
knowledge.56 This is best done in a context where the application of new knowledge, 
to real life situations, prevails.57,58  
Case exemplars should therefore ‘not be synthesized but instead be genuine, 
ensuring that the actual uncertainties, inconsistencies, imperfections, complexities 
and ambiguities of the clinical data are encompassed’.58 A teacher functions best 
when he or she is unfamiliar with the case exemplar because this forces them to 
demonstrate the process of clinical reasoning.55  
Keeping in mind the role of critical knowledge in the diagnostic process, an 
introduction to clinical reasoning needs to be initiated when students, who have a 
willingness to question, learn and compare information, are well grounded in core 
science knowledge. This will offer the stable foundation on which clinical reasoning 
frameworks can be constructed.   
1.10 EVALUATION OF DIAGNOSTIC THINKING PROCESSES 
There are two aspects of the diagnostic thinking process for which measurement 
instruments have been developed. This section of the literature review provides a 
summary of instruments used for both purposes. 
1.10.1 Diagnostic accuracy 
Diagnostic accuracy is the ability to use clinical information, obtained during a patient 
encounter, to make a correct diagnosis. To date, the routine use of valid, reliable and 
time efficient methods to determine the diagnostic accuracy of medical trainees 
remains a challenge.59 Based on an early assumption that clinical problem solving is 
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a generic ability, the earliest form of testing relied on the use of patient management 
problems (PMPs).60 This strategy, which asked students to respond to problems that 
were presented in a standardized format, soon became a widely accepted measure 
of clinical judgment.61 By the end of 1970 it was clear that PMPs, although having 
useful attributes, were dogged by psychometric inadequacies,62 and other 
assessment strategies (described below) were developed to replace PMPs.63 
 
Script Concordance Tests (SCTs)64 and Clinical Reasoning Problems (CRPs)65 were 
later developed to evaluate one or more aspects of the clinical reasoning process 
through questions directed at clinical scenarios. Both methods have been used in a 
variety of contexts and are recognized as useful ways of assessing the clinical 
reasoning skills of medical trainees.64,66 SCTs are a practical, valid and time efficient 
method of testing clinical reasoning in cases of clinical uncertainty,67 while CRPs 
provide a more comprehensive picture by evaluating the ability of trainees to 
synthesize clinical data and generate diagnostic hypotheses. When combined, these 
two instruments provide a comprehensive assessment of clinical reasoning, but the 
utility of this approach is limited by the time required to perform such a thorough 
assessment.65  
1.10.2 Cognition 
Cognition, the memory structures and processes used to store and retrieve pre-
existing knowledge is an essential prerequisite for the diagnostic thinking process.38 
In the process of unravelling the nature of memory structures clinicians use to store 
and retrieve information needed to make a diagnosis, Bordage, Grant and Marsden 
developed a self-administered instrument called the Diagnostic Thinking Inventory.25 
This tool, which contains forty-one statements that are rated using a Likert-type 
scale, focuses on delineating two essential features of human memory:  
• the way in which information is stored (memory structures) 
• the way in which information is retrieved (flexibility of thinking) 
Although to date there has been limited use of this instrument, the inventory has 
been validated as an appropriate way of measuring changes in cognitive elements 
required to make a diagnosis, with increasing levels of clinical experience and 
12 
training.25 The DTI has been used, for example, in the evaluation of the cognitive 
difference between medical students in traditional, as compared to problem-based 
learning curricula.68  
1.11 CONCLUSION 
The ability of health care professionals to make an accurate clinical diagnosis is 
regarded as the bedrock of efficient, safe, high-class patient care. It is, therefore, 
essential that new evidence in the science of clinical reasoning, problem solving and 
decision-making, continues to steer the direction taken by medical curricula around 
the world.69   
Based on the literature included in this review, it is clear that psychologists, health 
professions educators and clinicians agree that the diagnostic thinking process is not 
a generic skill and that there is no single set of diagnostic reasoning skills that can 
be acquired and taught to become an expert diagnostician.70 Current data do, 
however, suggest that there are metacognitive strategies which, if accompanied by 
enriched, well-organized knowledge, may improve the diagnostic competence of 
medical trainees.  
Before concluding this literature review it is essential to provide a global context for 
the work reported in this dissertation. After sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) emerged from 
colonial domination in the latter half of the last century, the forty-seven, then new, 
medical schools in the region, although eroded by political and economic hardship, 
committed to developing medical curricula that would not only be up to date and 
relevant, but also focus on reducing the shortage of ‘quality’ doctors practicing on the 
continent.71,72,73 In a recent review of the literature describing the state of medical 
education in SSA, the importance of innovative training strategies in medical 
curricula, to enhance the diagnostic thinking process of doctors, was once again 
highlighted.72  
The work reported in this dissertation explores teaching and learning strategies that 
speak to this mandate within the resource-limited context of health professions 
training in sub-Saharan Africa. Educators informed by the research reported in this 
review, and future work, can serve as powerful change agents in the process of 
13 
reforming health professions education, and thereby improving health care, one of 
the most important goals of the 21st century.74
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THE EFFECT OF STRUCTURED REFLECTION ON THE DIAGNOSTIC 
ACCURACY OF POSTGRADUATE TRAINEES DURING REAL PATIENT 
ENCOUNTERS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The ability to make a diagnosis is a multifaceted, cognitive process that serves as 
the cornerstone of clinical practice and is central to the provision of efficient, high-
class patient care.1,2,3,4,5 One of the most challenging aspects of clinical practice is 
the need to make an accurate provisional diagnosis at the time of the first patient 
consultation in order to reduce the burden of patient morbidity and mortality ascribed 
to diagnostic error.6,7,8,9 
Unravelling the cognitive structures and strategies clinicians use to generate, test 
and verify diagnoses has been the work of educational scientists for more than half a 
century.10,11 Despite a considerable body of research, teaching strategies that 
improve the diagnostic competence of clinical trainees is a topic that lacks robust, 
empiric evidence.11,12,13,14  
Delineation of this process has resulted in numerous hypothetical models, which 
have steered the direction taken by medical educators in attempts to develop and 
enhance the diagnostic competence of trainees. Over the past decade, reflection has 
been highlighted as a critical metaskill required to develop and maintain clinical 
diagnostic expertise.15 In 2004, Mamede and colleagues proposed a 
multidimensional model of reflective practice in medicine and developed a research 
strategy to evaluate the impact of a process of structured reflection on diagnostic 
accuracy.16  
This process has been shown to improve the diagnostic accuracy of medical 
residents when faced with complex clinical “paper” cases.17,18 Furthermore, 
conscious thought and deliberation is better than deliberation without attention when 
comparing the diagnostic accuracy of intermediate level medical students with that of 
novices.19 Structured reflection in an experimental setting has also been shown to 
improve students’ knowledge of illness exemplars and alternative diagnoses.12 It has 
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been suggested that this strategy may benefit medical trainees engaging in 
diagnostic reasoning processes using simulated patient case scenarios or real 
patient encounters.20 
To date, the bulk of the evidence supporting the use of reflective strategies to make 
accurate and improved clinical diagnoses has largely been determined in 
experimental conditions using medical students (novice clinicians) and ‘paper-
cases’.12,17,18,21,22 The impact of structured reflection on diagnostic accuracy during 
real patient encounters has not been evaluated. This represents an important gap in 
the literature because contextual factors,23 and factors associated with patient-
practitioner clinical encounter breakdown,24 typical of real clinical practice, have been 
shown to increase cognitive load and decrease diagnostic accuracy.9,25 Ideally, 
cognitive strategies aimed at improving outcome, should be studied in environments 
where the challenges of day-to-day clinical practice are taken into account. 
Furthermore, all the published work on diagnostic accuracy has used case 
descriptions that include the results of key investigations.12,17,18 Unfortunately, this 
also does not reflect real clinical practice, where the real challenge is to make an 
accurate provisional/working diagnosis during the first encounter with the patient to 
guide the selection of key investigations to confirm a diagnosis. The accuracy of the 
initial working/provisional diagnosis may have significant implications regarding the 
quality of care the patient receives,6 particularly resource limited settings where 
access to investigations is limited.  
While clinical reasoning research continues to explore the ways in which clinicians 
make diagnoses, the cognitive structures and processes required to store and recall 
the information required to make a diagnosis in the first instance, has received less 
attention in the medical education literature. What is known is that novice 
clinicians/medical students are unlikely to have developed an enriched core of 
domain-specific knowledge that forms the scientific foundation of clinical 
reasoning.26,27 The Diagnostic Thinking Inventory (DTI) (Appendix A), developed by 
Bordage, Grant and Marsden in the early 1980s, provides a self-reported measure of 
knowledge structures (memory) and flexibility of thinking (recall) based on a set of 
knowledge-independent statements scoring using a Likert rating scale. The DTI, 
implemented, validated28,29  and analysed in conjunction with other cognitive or 
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psychometric tests30 aims to provide insight into the accessibility of memorized 
information, which ultimately determines how a clinician sees, interprets and 
structures a clinical problem to be solved.31 The insight provided by such information 
may be useful when deciding on efficacy of proposed/implemented teaching 
strategies aimed at improving diagnostic competence.   
Given the limitations associated with studying diagnostic expertise and cognitive 
strategies in experimental settings as described, this study was conducted to 
determine the impact of structured reflection on the diagnostic accuracy of medical 
doctors in real patient encounters. The study specifically focused on making a 
working/provisional diagnosis at the bedside of real patients using history and 
physical examination findings only. Finding ways of improving diagnostic accuracy at 
the bedside can therefore make an important contribution to improving patient 
morbidity and mortality as well as curtailing the spiralling costs of health care.  
2.2 METHODS 
2.2.1 Participants 
All registrars (postgraduate specialist trainees) working in the Department of 
Medicine at the University of Cape Town (UCT), in Cape Town, South Africa during 
2014, were invited to participate in the study.  
2.2.2 Study design 
The impact of structured reflection on diagnostic accuracy was prospectively 
evaluated by performing a four-stage diagnostic process (Figure 2.1) during 18 
weekly bedside tutorials which formed part of the postgraduate clinical training 
programme at UCT. These tutorials, conducted by an attending physician with more 
than 20 years of undergraduate and postgraduate teaching experience, took place at 
the bedside of medical patients admitted to Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, 
one of the largest academic training hospitals in sub-Saharan African.32    
2.3 PROCEDURE 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the Faculty of Health Science at UCT (HREC: 762/2013) (Appendix B). 
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Participation was voluntary and written consent was obtained from all participants 
prior to entering the study. Patients gave verbal consent prior to participation in the 
bedside tutorials. Patients and trainees did not receive any compensation. 
At the time of entering the study, participants completed a Diagnostic Thinking 
Inventory questionnaire to evaluate their memory structures and flexibility in thinking, 
as reported by Bordage and colleagues.31 
2.3.1 Case Selection 
In preparation for each tutorial, a delegated registrar was responsible for organizing 
and identifying two potential patients who met three basic criteria:  
• the patient had a clinical presentation listed in the curriculum published by the
College of Physicians of South Africa 33
• the patient was well enough to participate in the tutorial
• the patient was willing to participate in the tutorial
The patients were discussed with the attending physician conducting the tutorial and 
one case was selected. A senior registrar, preparing for Part II of the College of 
Physicians of South Africa33 fellowship examination was asked to interview and 
examine the patient one hour before the tutorial took place. The trainee was not 
given any information about the patient and was asked not to consult the patient 
notes. 
Prior to commencing each tutorial the attending physician personally interviewed and 
examined the patient and made a working/provisional diagnosis. Access to patient 
notes and diagnostic investigations were made available to the physician when 
further diagnostic clarity was required. This was done to check reliability in order to 
minimise potential mistakes. 
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2.3.2 Case Tutorial  
Each bedside tutorial was conducted in four stages as shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Research method outline 
In Stage 1, the attending physician provided the tutorial participants with the patient’s 
presenting complaint, for example – shortness of breath, and asked them to make an 
immediate ‘spot’ diagnosis on the basis of the patient’s presenting complaint and any 
visual cues identified during a 5-minute period of silent observation upon arrival at 
the bedside. Participants recorded their four preferred diagnoses, in order of 
preference, on a blank A5 card, which was submitted before proceeding to the next 
stage of the tutorial. The data recorded on these cards were used to calculate a 
diagnostic accuracy score(DAS) for stage 1 (DAS 1). 
In Stage 2, the registrar who interviewed and examined the patient presented the 
key features of the history and physical examination only, i.e. a diagnosis was not 
offered at this stage of the tutorial. Thereafter, participants were asked to 
immediately record their four preferred diagnoses in order of preference, on a blank 
A5 card, which was submitted before proceeding to the next stage of the tutorial. The 











In Stage 3, participants moved to a side room in the ward to review a set of digitally 
projected case notes detailing all the key findings reported during the case 
presentation at the bedside. They were then asked to complete a Structured 
Reflection Chart (Appendix C) which was table comprising of four blank columns on 
an A4 sheet of paper. Working from left to right, participants completed the table as 
follows:  
• Column 1 was used to record the preferred four diagnoses, in order of 
preference, as recorded at the end of stage 2 of the tutorial; 
• Column 2 was used to record the key findings (including the history and 
physical examination) that supported the diagnoses listed in column 1 of the 
table; 
• Column 3 was used to record the findings that did not support the diagnoses 
listed in column 1; 
• Column 4 was used to list any key features that were not mentioned, i.e. 
‘missing features’ that would have been useful in ruling a specific diagnosis in 
or out. Participants were free to ask the presenting registrar about the 
‘missing features’ in the event that these were accidentally omitted from the 
bedside presentation. 
Participants repeated the four steps of the structured reflection process for all four 
preferred diagnoses recorded at the end of Stage 2 of the tutorial. In addition, they 
were asked to record and repeat the reflection process for any other diagnoses that 
came to mind during the process of reflection. At the end of the 15-mintue period of 
reflection, registrars recorded their top four diagnoses in order of preference on a 
blank A5 card, which was submitted before proceeding to the final stage of the 
tutorial. The data recorded on these cards were used to calculate DAS 3. 
Stage 4 during the tutorial, the registrar who presented the patient provided his/her 
working diagnosis and the supporting key features. Thereafter, the attending 
physician initiated a bedside discussion of case, specifically focusing on the key 
clinical findings (forceful features)3 of the history and physical examination and 
identified any diagnostic errors related to the omission or misinterpretation of key 
clinical findings. In closing, the attending physician provided an interpretation of the 
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case from the perspective of an expert clinician. Participants were then asked to 
record their final assessment of the case on a blank A5 card, which was submitted at 
the end of the tutorial. The data recorded on these cards were used to calculate DAS 
4. 
At the end of each tutorial, once all the experimental data (DAS 1-4) had been 
collected, the attending physician, together with the participants, reviewed any 
additional information contained in the patient’s hospital records, including 
investigations performed during the patient’s hospital stay. This provided final 
closure of the case discussion and was used to formulate the final assessment 
recorded in Table 2.  
2.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
All data submitted by participants were anonymised using an alphanumeric identifier. 
A Diagnostic Accuracy Score (DAS) was calculated (summed) for each participant at 
the end of each stage of the tutorial process(DAS1-4) using the scoring method 
described in Table 2.1, and entered into a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet®. The 
scoring method was designed to reflect two aspects of diagnostic accuracy:  
• correctness of the working diagnosis made, i.e. completely correct = 2 points,
partially correct = 1 point and incorrect = 0 points
• position (rank order) of the partially or completely correct diagnosis, i.e. at the
top of the list = 2 points, not at the top of the list = 1 point and not on the list =
0 points
Table 2.1: Diagnostic accuracy scoring system 
Diagnosis and rank order Score 
Incorrect diagnosis 0 
Partially correct diagnosis but incorrect rank order 1 
Partially correct diagnosis and correct rank order 2 
Correct diagnosis but incorrect rank order 3 
Correct diagnosis and correct rank order 4 
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Statistical analysis was performed using the software, R® version 3.2.1. Median 
scores for each stage of the diagnostic thinking process (DAS1 – DAS4) were 
compared using the Friedman test, a nonparametric version of the repeated 
measures ANOVA. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to further compare 
median values for pairs of data – DAS 1 versus DAS 2, DAS 2 versus DAS 3, DAS 3 
versus DAS 4, DAS 1 versus DAS 3 (a measure of independent performance). A 
Bonferroni correction was applied and a p-value of 0.0167 or less was considered 
significant. 
The relationship between participants DTI scores and post-reflection DAS was 




Of the 66 registrars in the department, 61 (92.4%) participated in the study. Seven 
were excluded (incomplete data) and the data from the remaining 55 participants 
(90.2%) was included in the final analysis. The mean age of the participants was 32 
years (SD 3.4 years); 24 (43.6%) were women and each participant had an average 
of six years clinical practice experience including two years internship and one year 
obligatory community service practice for doctors registered with the Health 
Professions Counsel of South Africa.34
2.5.2  Diagnostic Events 
Eighteen bedside tutorials were conducted during the study. Each participant 
provided one diagnostic event on completion of DAS 1 – 4 for a given tutorial. A total 
of 212 diagnostic events were included in the study.  For each tutorial the final 
diagnosis, as listed in Table 2.2, was made at the end of the bedside teaching 
session based on key clinical findings (interview and physical examination) and the 
the results of investigations available in the case notes. 
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Table 2.2: Clinical case, presenting problem and preferred working diagnosis 
Case  Presenting 
problem 
Final assessment 
Case 1 Haemoptysis 17-year-old man with post pulmonary tuberculosis 
(TB) bronchiectasis, complicated by ongoing 
haemoptysis secondary to rifampicin-induced 
thrombocytopenia 
Case 2 Progressive 
difficulty in walking 
29-year-old HIV-positive woman (stage 4 defining 
disease), with a lumbosacral polyradiculopathy 
secondary to reactivated disseminated tuberculosis 
Case 3 Acute onset chest 
pain  
21-year-old man with end stage kidney disease 
(chronic glomerulonephritis - IgA nephropathy) 
complicated by septic pulmonary emboli from a 
dialysis catheter-related blood stream infection 
Case 4 Headache 55-year-old HIV-negative woman with a fungal 
meningitis (Cryptococcus neoformans) being worked 
up for a primary or secondary immunodeficiency 
syndrome later confirmed to have systemic lupus 
erythematosus 
Case 5 Heart murmur and 
shortness of 
breath 
27-year-old man with mixed mitral and aortic valve 
disease, secondary to childhood rheumatic heart 
disease complicated by severe pulmonary 
hypertension confirmed on echocardiography 
Case 6 Joint/back pain 21-year-old female with a ventricular septal defect 
complicated by blood culture proven infective 
endocarditis  
Case 7 Progressive 
dyspnoea 
48-year-old woman with previous acute myeloid 
leukaemia and a bone marrow transplant 
complicated by a graft-versus-host disease, 
interstitial lung disease and pulmonary hypertension  




48-year-old woman previous treated breast cancer 
presenting with proximal myopathy most likely due 
to a paraneoplastic phenomenon or hypothyroidism  
Case 9 Fatigue 51-year-old woman with pancytopenia and a 
massive hepatosplenomegaly due to a 
haematological malignancy confirmed on bone 
marrow biopsy 
Case 10 Dysarthria 29-year-old female patient presenting with a stroke-
like syndrome from systemic lupus erythematosus 
and antiphospholipid syndrome  
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Case  Presenting 
problem 
Final assessment 
Case 11 Swollen legs 37-year-old woman with nephrotic syndrome 
secondary to an HIV associated nephropathy  
Case 12 Recurrent 
episodes of 
collapse 
29-year-old woman with hypopituitarism secondary 
to Sheehan’s syndrome confirmed MRI and 
appropriate blood tests  
Case 13 Dysphagia 54-year-old male patient with multiple strokes 
secondary to severe atherosclerotic disease 
confirmed on CT imaging  
Case 14 Lymphadenopathy 34-year-old HIV-positive man with a superior vena 
cava syndrome as a result of external compression 
by significant generalized lymphadenopathy due to 
disseminated tuberculosis 
Case 15 Short stature 36-year-old woman with childhood-onset rheumatoid 
arthritis resulting in stunted growth and multiple 
vertebral fractures due to steroid-induced 
osteoporosis confirmed by imaging 
Case 16 Visual loss 56-year-old woman with a suprasellar mass lesion 
and raised intracranial pressure later confirmed to 
be myeloma with optic chiasm compression 
Case 17 Pulmonary 
hypertension 
57-year-old woman with longstanding rheumatoid 
arthritis and interstitial lung disease complicated by 
pulmonary hypertension confirmed by 
echocardiography  
Case 18 Diplopia 82-year-old man with a 3rd nerve palsy secondary to 
an embolic stroke due to severe atherosclerotic 






Table 2.3 shows the number of participants that attended each bedside tutorial (n) 
and the median diagnostic accuracy scores (DAS) and interquartile ranges for 
participants captured.  
Table 2.3: Diagnostic accuracy scores at each stage of the diagnostic process 
Case n. DAS 1   (median +IQR) 
DAS 2   
(median +IQR) 
DAS3   
(median +IQR) 
DAS4    
(median +IQR) 
1 18 0.50 (0.00-1.00) 2.00 (1.00-3.00) 3.00 (1.00-4.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
2 13 1.00 (0.00-2.25) 2.00 (1.00-2.50) 2.00 (1.75-3.25) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
3 11 0.00 (0.00-0.75) 2.00 (0.25-2.00) 3.00 (1.25-4.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
4 12 1.00 (0.50-1.00) 1.50 (1.00-2.00) 1.00 (1.00-2.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
5 15 1.00 (1.00-2.00) 2.00 (2.00-2.00) 2.00 (2.00-3.75) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
6 17 1.00 (0.00-1.50) 2.00 (2.00-3.00) 2.00 (2.00-4.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
7 12 0.00 (0.00-0.00) 2.00 (1.00-2.00) 2.00 (1.50-2.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
8 5 0.00 (0.00-0.25) 2.00 (1.75-2.50) 2.00 (1.75-3.25) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
9 15 1.00 (0.00-1.00) 1.00 (1.00-2.75) 3.00 (1.00-3.75) 4,00 (3.25-4.00) 
10 11 1.50 (0.00-2.00) 2.50 (1.00-4.00) 2.00 (2.00-4.00) 2.00 (2.00-4.00) 
11 9 3.00 (1.75-3.25) 0.00 (0.00-3.25) 0.00 (0.00-3.25) 4.00 (3.00-4.00) 
12 14 0.00 (0.00-1.00) 1.00 (0.00-2.00) 2.00 (1.00-4.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
13 11 2.00 (0.25-2.00) 3.00 (3.00-3.75) 3.00 (3.00-4.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
14 9 2.00 (1.75-2.00) 2.00 (1.00-3.25) 2.00 (1.75-4.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
15 11 1.00 (0.00-3.00) 3.00 (3.00-4.00) 3.00 (3.00-4.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
16 12 0.00 (0.00-0.50) 2.00 (1.00-2.00) 2.00 (1.00-2.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
17 8 2.00 (1.00-2.50) 2.00 (1.50-3.50) 3.50 (2.50-4.00) 4.00 (4.00-4.00) 
18 9 0.00 (0.00-1.25) 1.00 (0.00-2.25) 2.00 (0.75-2.00) 4.00 (3.50-4.00) 
MEAN  0.94 (0.35-1.51) 1.83 (1.19-2.76) 2.19 (1.57-3.40) 3.89 (3.76- 4.00) 
 
There was a statistically significant difference between the median scores of the 
respective stages of the diagnostic reasoning process (χ2(3) = 406.34, p value < 
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0.001). Further comparison of the median values of each stage of the process were 
significantly different – DAS 1 versus DAS 2 (Z = 8.66, p value < 0.001), DAS 2 
versus DAS 3 (Z = 4.98, p value < 0.001), DAS 3 versus DAS 4 (Z = 10.14, p value 
value <0.001) and DAS 1 versus DAS 3 (Z = 9.81, p value <0.001)  (Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Diagnostic accuracy scores (DAS) using boxplots for 
each stage of the diagnostic process, with the median score (solid line), mean score (cross), upper 
and lower quartile (box) and minimum and maximum scores (black dash) represented. In DAS 4, the 
solid dots represent three outliers. The respective p-values for both the Friedman test and the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are provided. 
2.6 DIAGNOSTIC THINKING INVENTORY 
Figure 2.3 shows the mean DTI scores for 46 participants included in this study who 
completed a DTI as compared to the mean DTI scores of third year medical 





























Figure 2.3: Comparison of the Diagnostic Thinking Inventory (DTI) scores of 
University of Cape Town (UCT) study participants and a range of UK trainees and General 
Practitioners as reported by Bordage et al in 1990.31 The boxplots show mean scores, interquartile 
range (1st and 3rd) and the 97.5% confidence interval. 
A Pearson product moment correlation coefficient of 0.3 indicates a limited 
correlation between participant DTI scores and DAS 3. A linear regression does 
however indicate DTI as a significant factor in determining DAS 3 (p value = 0.035). 


























Figure 2.4: Relationship between DAS 3 and DTI scores  
2.7 DISCUSSION 
The findings of this study show that structured reflection, as described by Mamede 
and colleagues, had a positive effect on the diagnostic accuracy of postgraduate 
trainees during real patient encounters. The study conditions in this work 
represented authentic clinical practice as compared to previous studies in which 
undergraduates (medical or non-medical) were required to make diagnoses using 
simulated objective structured clinical examinations (OSCE) or paper cases based 
on real patient scenarios.12,17,18,21,22 This study has therefore addressed an important 
gap in the literature by using real patient encounters where construct irrelevant 
variables that do not contribute to, or which may detract from the diagnosis (red 
herrings), are present. Reflection, a key metaskill needed for clinical reasoning,16 
provided registrars at the bedside with a tool that enabled them to improve their 
diagnostic accuracy.  
Constructing multiple hypotheses and reflecting on the validity and implications of 
each, brings about an enriched understanding of the problem whilst providing an 
efficient and thoughtful approach to solving it.35 One can postulate that this cognitive 






















patient encounters of today to improve diagnostic accuracy by reducing potential 
errors and minimize the negative effect they have on patient care. Reflection-in-
action when faced with uncertain circumstances activates mental representation of 
disease allowing the clinician to respond to novel situations.36 Future work needs to 
pay close attention to the gap between pre- and post-reflection diagnostic accuracy, 
looking specifically at how the activation of mental representation occurs at the 
bedside, its effect on clinical error and the implications these will have on patient 
outcomes.  
Reflective practice has been seen to be associated with the generation of more 
accurate hypotheses when used in complex cases.17 However, we would like to 
propose that the prevalence of certain cases might be more influential in determining 
the diagnostic outcome and the influence had by analytical reflection as opposed to 
‘case complexity’. ‘Case 1’ in this study is a prime example, where many registrars 
were able to make an intuitive diagnosis based on their experience of managing high 
volumes of patients with pulmonary tuberculosis (TB). Rifampicin-induced 
thrombocytopenia is a rare and complex phenomenon37 however, in the context in 
which we practice medicine, where TB prevalence is extremely high, we are 
continually exposed to the drug and its side effects. Repeated exposures to such 
cases doesn’t take away from the fact that the case remains complex. It does 
however reduce its ‘rarity’, which we feel is more significant than complexity when it 
comes to designing a study to test the outcome that specific learning strategies have 
on diagnostic accuracy. Trainees need to adopt a more structured approach when 
addressing rare, first time cases and we feel that it is under these conditions that 
structured reflection may have a dominant role to play.  
This study also showed that in this setting, where visual information is often limited, 
accuracy of an immediate spot diagnosis at the outset of a consultation was poor.  It 
is widely recognized that the process of clinical problem solving commences as soon 
as any information about a patient, including visual cues, are obtained.38 Pattern 
recognition depends on well-constructed, dense ‘illness scripts’ that result in 
clinicians actively seeking further information until the pattern is recognized and 
defined as a potential diagnostic interpretation. Although visual cues are needed to 
stimulate the recognition of clinical patterns, clinicians require the metaskill to access 
35 
preformed illness scripts so that diagnostic errors can be avoided. The challenge 
remains how we identify such cognitive errors and situations in which they are 
compounded, and make use of taught skill to ensure that they are no longer 
introduced into clinical reasoning.   
The role played by the bedside teacher in facilitating the acquisition of immediate 
diagnostic accuracy was made evident between stage 3 to stage 4 of the tutorial. 
The significant improvement between DAS 3 to DAS 4 highlights the importance of 
facilitated bedside teaching. The teacher ensures that the dynamic learning 
oppurtunity afforded by real life bedside teaching is maximised, closing the gap in 
the teaching process. Although not a primary objective of this paper, and given the 
limitations associated with having only one attending physician with a structured, yet 
not defined process of facilitation, such a finding provides an area where future work 
is needed to delineate the exact role of the facilitator during real life bedside tutorials. 
Lastly, unknown to us is the way in which reflective skill influences illness scripts and 
whether or not repeated use of this metaskill expedites the development of clinical 
expertise. What we have identified is that there is a correlation between clinical 
reasoning ability (an indirect measure of expertise) that is influenced by analytical 
reflection and diagnostic accuracy. Although not perfectly correlated, our univariate 
regression of DTI scores to DAS supports the need for academic curricula to adopt 
teaching strategies, such as analytical reflection, that may enhance clinical 
reasoning and ultimately improve diagnostic accuracy. Future work is required to 
take this further and identify other major factors such as age, experience and 
disease prevalence that may or may not influence diagnostic outcome, from which 
curricula frameworks can take direction.  
Our study had several limitations. 
First, although regarded as a single centre study, our trainees and study participants 
originated from a range of centres distributed all over Africa. This multicentre 
alternative provided data from graduates ranging from South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, Benin and Libya. 
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Second, our cohort size, and in particular the number of participant patient 
encounters, which relied on the bedside tutorial attendance over and above daily 
after hour demands, prevented us from accurately assessing whether analytical 
reflection can be ‘learnt’ over a period of time. 
Third, our study was designed to provide a quantitative evaluation of the impact that 
analytical reflection has on diagnostic accuracy in real patient encounters. There is a 
clear need to assess the quality of structured reflection and how this may influence 
diagnostic outcome. Future work is aimed at assessing this, looking at the role of a 
good reflective practitioner and the effect is has on diagnostic accuracy.  
Lastly, the quality of trainees’ illness scripts and domain specific knowledge, an 
essential component of expert clinical reasoning39 was not evaluated in this study. 
Although our cohort of participants had all passed their undergraduate degrees, 
providing the study with a baseline measure of core knowledge, our method lacked 
the ability to accurate evaluate this. Irrespective of high quality problem solving skills, 
if the pieces of the puzzle are lacking, the picture can never be constructed.  
2.8 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, structured reflection can be used as a bedside teaching tool to 
improve diagnostic accuracy during real patient encounters. The facilitator plays a 
vital role in ensuring that the gap in the teaching process is closed and that the 
tutorial potential is maximised and truly completed. The DTI appears to be a valid 
way of assessing a measure of clinical reasoning and expertise amongst a cohort of 
South African medical registrars. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between 
clinical reasoning and diagnostic accuracy. Avenues to be further explored by future 
research will need to take into account the quality of reflection, the quality of illness 
scripts, the type of cases (rare versus complex) that draw maximum benefit from 
being a reflective practitioner and errors reduced by reflective strategies and their 
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APPENDIX A: The Diagnostic Thinking Inventory developed by Bordage, Grant 
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6. When it comes to making up my mind about a diagnosis, 
(10) 
I do not mind postponing my 
diagnostic decisions about a case 
7. Once the patient has clearly presented his symptoms and signs, 
(12) 
I think about them in my mind in the 
patient's own words 
8. In relation to the routine history 
(15) 
I often feel that I did not sufficiently 
cover the routine history 
9. As the patient tells his story and the case unfolds, 
(16) 
I often find it difficult to remember 
what has been said 
10. During the course of an interview, I find that 
(17) 
Some key pieces of information seem 
to leap out at me 
11. When I cannot make sense of the patient's symptoms, 
(18) 
I move on and gather new information 
to trigger new ideas 
12. In considering diagnostic possibilities, 
(19) 
I often come up with unlikely 
diagnoses 
13. While I am collecting information about a patient, 
(20) 
The various items of information 
usually seem to group themselves 
together in my mind 
I feel obliged to go for one diagnosis 
or another even if I am not 
very certain 
I translate them in my mind into 
medical terms (e.g. numbness 
becomes paraesthesia or paralysis) 
I usually cover the routine history to 
my satisfaction 
I can usually keep track in my mind of 
what has been said 
It is often difficult to know which 
items of information to latch on to 
I ask the patient to define those 
symptoms more clearly 
I am usually in the right area 
I often have difficulty seeing how the 
pieces of information relate to 
each other 
14. When the diagnosis becomes known and I realize that I have missed it initially, 
(21) 
It is often because I knew the disease 
but failed to think about it 
15. During the clinical interview, 
(22) 
I cannot bring myself to dismiss some 
information as irrelevant 
16. When I cannot make sense of the patient's symptoms and signs, 
(23) 
I move on to get new information 
and a new perspective 
It is often because I did not know 
enough about the disease 
I am quite happy to dismiss some 
information as irrelevant 
I look at them from a different 
perspective before moving on 
44 
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_17. When I consider a number of possible diagnoses, 
(24) 
The diagnoses tend to be related to 
one another 
18. When a possible diagnosis comes to my mind, 
(25) 
1 usually find myself anticipating 
possible abnormal signs and 
symptoms that go with that diagnosis 
19. When I know very little about a particular type of disease, 
(26) 
I can still usually come up with 
a diagnosis 
20. In considering the patient's signs and symptoms, 
(27) 
I think of them each in absolute terms 
as stated by the patient 
The diagnoses tend to be scattered 
Quite often, it does not help me to 
decide what to ask the patient next 
I have great difficulty in 
reaching a diagnosis 
I think of them in terms of possible 
opposites (e.g. progressive vs sudden; 
unilateral vs bilateral; spastic 
vs flaccid) 
21. When I know a lot about a particular type of disease and have to make a diagnosis, 
(28) 
[ find it relatively easy to pin down 
a diagnosis 
I often seem to be all over the place 
and have difficulty pinning 
down a diagnosis 
22. As the history progresses and I already have some ideas about the possible diagnosis(es), 
(29) 
New information often makes me 
have more ideas 
23. When I am taking a history, I find that, 
(31) 
I can get new ideas just by going over 
the existing information in my mind 
24. When the patient uses imprecise or ambiguous expressions, 
(32) 
I let him go on to maintain the flow 
of the interview 
25. After an interview with a patient, 
(34) 
I rarely think of other things that I 
should have asked in relation to the 
patient's disorder 
New information does not often 
make me have more ideas 
I need to have new information to 
make me have a new idea about 
the case 
I make him clarify precisely what he 
means before going on 
I often think of other things that I 
should have asked in relation to the 
patient's disorder 
26. When a piece of information comes along and makes me think of a possible diagnosis, 
(35) 
It often makes me go back to 
previous information to see if things 
fit together or not 
It rarely makes me review the 
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27. fn relation to the diagnosis r eventually make, 
(36) 
I usually have very few doubts 
28. In making a diagnostic decision, 
(37) 
r decide by considering each possible 
diagnosis separately on its own merits 
I often feel too uncertain for my 
own comfort 
I decide by comparing and contrasting 
the various possible diagnoses 
29. When I know a lot about a particular type of disease and have to make a diagnosis, 
(40) 
I check up on most possibilities before 
reaching a decision 
30. As the case unfolds, 
(41) 
I do not find it useful to summarize as 
I go along 
31. When I reach my diagnostic decisions. 
(42) 
There is often left-over information [ 
have just forgotten about 
I often have lots of ideas that r don't 
explore further 
1 periodically take stock of the data 
and my ideas 
I usually will have considered all the 
information 
32. When r have got an idea about what might be wrong with the patient, 
(43) 
r feel most comfortable if r can follow 
it up without being diverted 
I feel happy to go off on another tack 
and come back to my 
original ideas later 
33. When I come up with a broad idea as to what might be wrong with the patient, 
(44) 
I can usually proceed to a specific 
diagnosis 
34. Throughout the interview, 
(45) 
I manage to test my ideas even if I let 
the patient control the interview 
I find it difficult to put it into 
specific terms 
I am only successful if I can control 
the direction of the interview 
35. In relation to choosing from among the diagnostic ideas that I have, 
(47) 
I am usually not capable of wholly 
ruling out any of the ideas I have had 
36. Once [ have made up my mind about a patient, 
(49) 
I am prepared to change my mind 
37. When I consider my diagnostic ideas, I do so on the basis of, 
(51) 
On the case as a whole so far 
I am capable of ruling out most of my 
ideas completely 
r really do not like to change 
my mind 
A few outstanding symptoms 
or signs 
46 
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38. If I do not know what to make of a clinical interview, 
(52) 
I can readily see the information 
in new ways 
I find it difficult to see the information 
in new ways 
39. When l order laboratory tests, 
(53) 
I do it as part of the routine clinical 
investigation 
40. In considering diagnostic possibilities, 
(54) 
I compare and contrast the possible 
diagnoses 
41. In terms of the way I conduct an interview, 
(56) 
I usually cover the ground that I need 
to during the interview 
NB. Item category identification: 
I do it expecting specific information 
or supporting evidence 
I consider each diagnosis separately on 
its own merits 
Quite often I do not ask all the 
questions that I should at the time 
Flexibility in thinking: 
(21 items) 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11 , 15, 16, 23, 24, 26, 27, 
28. 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41. 
Evidence for structure in memory: 
(20 items) 
1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13. 14, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 21, 22, 25, 29, 31, 33, 37, 39. 
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